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Nuclear, Chemical, and
Biological Weapons
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Howard
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Introduction

C

hapter 10 of The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations!
is concerned with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. While
the extent that the use of these weapons, other than nuclear, will impinge
on naval warfare (except in connection with naval surface and naval air
bombardment ofland objectives, riverine operations, etc.) is probably fairly
limited, the draftsmen of the Handbook have deemed it appropriate to include
a full chapter on these subjects - and rightly so. In addition to discussing the
evolution and present status of the applicable rules of the international law
of war with respect to each of those categories of weapons, this commentary
will discuss the extent to which those rules affect naval warfare qua naval
warfare and the extent to which they affect the operations of naval units
against objectives on land.

Nuclear Weapons
When the first atom bomb exploded over Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, it
began a new (and perilous) era for the planet Earth. It also began a controversy
which has yet to be resolved to the satisfaction of a great many people.
Not unexpectedly, sometime after the facts with respect to the nature of
the atom bomb and the extent of the casualties and damage inflicted at
Hiroshima and Nagasaki became generally known, an issue was raised as to
the legality or illegality of the use of the atom bomb - and, subsequently,
the same issue was, of course, raised as to the use of its far more powerful
and devastating successors. In the discussion which follows it must be borne
in mind that while there are a number of conventions placing various types
of restrictions on nuclear weapons,2 there is no convention which specifically
outlaws their use. 3 In light of the complete failure of all of the practically
endless efforts undertaken since 1945 to accomplish this result, to argue that
The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.
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the use of such weapons is prohibited by inference derived from the provisions
of international agreements dating from 1868, from 1899, or from 1907,
appears to be the equivalent of tilting at windmills. In view of the foregoing
this writer concurs with the statement contained in the Handbook to the effect
that, "There are no rules of customary or conventional international law
prohibiting nations from employing nuclear weapons in armed conflict."4
Nevertheless, a brief analysis of the arguments pro and con appears to be
warranted.
The 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War,
of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes WeightS contained a number
of humanitarian preambular clauses:
That the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during
war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy;
That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men;
That this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly
aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable;
That the employment of such arms would, therefore be contrary to the laws of
humanity.

During the course of the drafting of what became the 1899 Hague Convention
(II) With Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land6 and its annexed
Regulations, several provisions were included which have often been cited as
affecting the subject under discussion. These provisions were:
Art. 22. The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy are not
unlimited.
Art. 23. In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially
forbidden:
(a) To employ poison or poisoned weapons; ...
(e) To employ arms, projectiles, or material of a nature to cause superfluous
injury; ...

The cognate provisions of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annexed Regulations are essentially
identical with those quoted above. 7
Realizing, however, that these and the other provisions that were to be
included in the Regulations could not possibly cover all of the contingencies
that might arise during the course of a war, the Russian representative at
the 1899 Peace Conference, Martens, a noted international lawyer, proposed,
and the Conference agreed, that a paragraph be included in the preamble
which would read:
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Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties
think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them,
populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles
of international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations,
from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience.8

Assuming that ~ese preambular provisions are law-making in nature, a
number of questions arise. Did the use of the atomic bombs in 1945 weaken
the military forces of the enemy? Did it uselessly aggravate the sufferings
of disabled men, or render their death inevitable? Did it exceed the limits
which a belligerent may adopt as a means of injuring the enemy? Did it
constitute the use of "poison"? Did it represent the employment of a weapon
"calculated to cause unnecessary suffering"? Did it constitute a failure to give
the populations and belligerents "the protection and empire of the principles
of international law, as they result from the usages established between
civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the
public conscience" to which they were entitled? And, most important, if one
or more of these questions is answered in the 'affirmative, does the particular
principle apply if the alternative would have resulted in a million American
military casualties and an even greater number ofJapanese casualties, military
and civilian? In other words, was the principle of proportionality applicable?9
While all of those questions have been posed here with respect to Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, they will likewise have to be asked - and answered - before
any future use of nuclear weapons.
Literally hundreds of books and articles have been written on both sides
of the questions posed and it is doubtful that any proponent of either side
of the argument has been successful in convincing anyone who disagrees with
his position that it is correct and that the other person's position is incorrect.
The present writer does not propose to draw himself into that quagmire.
Suffice it to say that nuclear weapons are with us and at the present time
there does not appear to be any possibility that they will disappear, at least
in the foreseeable future. Under those circumstances we can only hope that
neither side will make the mistake of using them and thus bring an end to
civilization, and to life itself, on this planet.
There is, of course, an area of nuclear warfare in which navies would play
an important role. A preemptive first strike by one side might possibly
eliminate much of the other side's land-based nuclear deterrent force - but
it could not reach the deployed naval-based force, the submarines of which
are the ever-mobile carriers of nuclear ballistic missiles. Thus, this potential
naval retaliatory force, maintained by both parties involved in the eyeballto-eyeball confrontation which has more or less existed since shortly after
the end of W orId War II, is a major factor in the policy of deterrence.
Moreover, the strength and speed of these nuclear-powered and nucleararmed submarines are reputedly such that there are experts who believe that
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they can only be destroyed by nuclear weapons, such as nuclear-armed depth
charges or nuclear-armed torpedoes. If such is the tase, the use of these latter
nuclear weapons becomes almost inevitable as during a period of active
hostilities, whether we call it war or armed conflict, no nation and no navy
is going to permit enemy nuclear-powered submarines armed with nuclear
ballistic missiles to roam the seas unchallenged.
One problem which arises is whether successful conventional-weapons
attacks on nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed submarines (and surface
vessels) would ad~ersely affect the waters of the oceans and the air of the
atmosphere. While the United States has lost two nuclear submarines with
no such adverse effects, this is far from conclusive as the two crews would
probably have shut down the nuclear reactors and any nuclear weapons aboard
the submarines would not have been armed; accordingly, the amount of
radioactivity released by each of those vessels would have been minimal. How
much environmental damage would be caused by the sinking of a nucleararmed and nuclear-powered submarine with its reactor in operation appears
to be a relative unknown. Moreover, should a war reach the nuclear stage,
it is a virtual certainty that any naval engagement would include the use of
nuclear weapons against the opposing enemy fleets. When this occurs the
extent of the contamination of the oceans and of the atmosphere is incalculable
as nuclear explosions would be taking place both in the atmosphere and in
the water and nuclear-powered ships would be sunk with their reactors in
operation.tO Of course, should a war reach the nuclear stage, such matters
would be a small, and comparatively unimportant, part of the overall picture.
The ballistic missiles carried by nuclear-powered submarines, referred to
above, would, of course, if used, be directed against objectives on land. It
is doubtful, but not inconceivable, that in a nuclear war a naval bombardment
of objectives on land might include nuclear-armed shells and missiles.
However, should a war reach that stage, the results of any such bombardment
would be miniscule compared to the results that could be expected from landbased nuclear ballistic missiles, from the nuclear ballistic missiles released
from below the surface of the seas, and from the nuclear weapons dropped
from the air.
It is probably necessary to conclude that if and when an armed conflict
approaches the nuclear stage, law will playa very small role in determining
the actions of the belligerents.

Chemical Weapons
Chemical warfare agents have been defined as "chemical substances,
whether gaseous, liquid, or solid, which might be employed because of their
direct toxic effects on man, animals and plants. "11
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The earliest formal international attempt to prohibit the use of chemicals
in warfare occurred at the 1899 Hague Peace Conference which drafted and
adopted a Declaration stating, "The Contracting Parties agree to abstain from
the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating
or deleterious gases. "12 This Declaration was of unlimited duration. All of
the major European Powers, including France, Germany, Russia, and the
United Kingdom, signed and ratified it. The United States neither signed nor
ratified it.
The 1899 Declaration was in force during World War I. Despite this,
Germany used gas against the Russians in Poland in January 1915. The gas
was delivered by artillery shells but, because of the sub-zero weather, had
little effect and the incident passed almost unnoticed. 13 The first major, and
well-documented, use of gas occurred in France, on April 22, 1915, when the
Germans opened containers of compressed chlorine, permitting a favoring
wind to blow the gas towards the Allied Ypres salient. 14 The success of the
operation far exceeded expectations15 and before the war was brought to an
end more than three years later many other chemical weapons were being
used by both sides and were being delivered by artillery, mortars, projectors,
etc. 16 The Treaty of Versailles, which legally terminated World War I as
between Germany and the Allies, contained the following provision:
Article 171
The use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials
or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden
in Germany.
The same applies to materials specially intended for the 'manufacture, storage and
use of the said products or devices.17

The 1922 Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments,
consisting of representatives of France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom,
and the United States, drafted a treaty which was primarily concerned with
submarine warfare but which included the following provisions:
Art. 5. The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous
liquids, materials or devices, having been justly condemned by the general opinion of
the civilized world and a prohibition of such use having been declared in treaties to
which a majority of the civilized Powers are parties,
The signatory Powers, to the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted
as a part ofintemationallaw binding alike the conscience and practice ofnations, declare
their assent to such prohibition, agree to be bound thereby as between themselves and
invite all other civilized nations to adhere thereto. IS

To become effective this treaty required the ratification of all of the
participants in the Conference. France refused to ratify it because of
objections to some of the provisions with respect to submarine warfare.
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Accordingly, the treaty never entered into force. However, three years later
another conference, this one concerned with international trade in weapons
and ammunition, drafted the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the
Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological
Methods ofWarfare.19 While much ofits wording was taken almost verbatim
from the prior draftings, its importance warrants the setting forth of its
operative provisions in their entirety:
Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous
liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the
civilized world; and
Whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in Treaties to which the
majority of Powers of the world are Parties; and
To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part ofInternational
Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations;
Declare:
That the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties to Treaties
prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this prohibition to the
use of bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound as between themselves
according to the terms of this declaration.

Strange to relate, while the United States had ratified the Washington Treaty,
with its provision prohibiting the use of poisonous gases, just two years earlier,
and was the chief proponent of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, it did not ratify
the latter until 50 years later, in 1975!
Many of the states which have ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol have
done so with a so-called "first use" reservation. Typical of those reservations
is that of the United Kingdom: "The said Protocol shall cease to be binding
on His Britannic Majesty toward any Power at enmity with him whose armed
forces, or the armed forces of whose allies, fail to respect the prohibitions
laid down in the Protocol."2O It does not appear that this "first use"
reservation has ever been invoked despite the not-infrequent use of the
prohibited gases. For example, Italy, a party to the Protocol (as was
Ethiopia), admittedly used poison gas in its 1935-1936 war with Ethiopia.
Japan, although a party to the 1899 Declaration, did not ratify the Protocol
until after World War II. On June 5,1942, President Roosevelt warned the
Japanese against the use of poisonou~ gas. 21 While at that time Japan denied
using such gas in China,22 it has never officially denied such use since the
end of the war. Egypt, a Party to the 1925 Protocol (as was the Yemen Arab
Republic.), is alleged to have used gas in the civil war in Yemen. Iraq, also
a party to the Protocol (as is Iran), has been accused of using gas in its recent
war with Iran.23 In none of these cases is there evidence of retaliation in
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kind, probably because the victim of the gas attack was not in possession
of a stock of chemical weapons.
During World War II Hitler on occasion considered ~he use of chemical
weapons against England. However, he apparently realized, or his military
advisers were able to convince him, that Germany's opponents were well able
to reply in kind and that, in the long run, the use of such weapons would
be self-defeating to Germany.24 OnJune 5,1943, President Roosevelt warned
Germany that the use of chemical weapons by any Axis country against any
one of the United Nations would result in "swift retaliation in kind,"
specifying that the targets would be "munition centers, seaports, and other
military objectives throughout the whole extent of the territory of such Axis
country."25 With the possible exception of Japanese use in China, chemical
weapons were not used by any belligerent during World War II.26
The General Assembly of the United Nations has adopted a number of
resolutions on the subject of chemical warfare. 27 A resolution adopted in 1968,
among other things, requested the Secretary-General to prepare, with the
assistance of experts, a report on chemical and bacteriological (biological)
weapons. 28 This report, which was submitted to the General Assembly in 1969,
found that "because of the scale and intensity of the potential effects of their
use, they are considered as weapons of mass destruction."29 The report
contained the following statement:
The general conclusion of the report can thus be summed up in a few lines. Were
these weapons ever to be used on a large scale in war, no one could predict how enduring
the effects would be, and how they would affect the structure of society and the
environment in which we live.30

Upon the receipt of that report the General Assembly adopted a resolution
to the effect that the 1925 Geneva Protocol "embodies the generally
recognized rules of international law prohibiting the use in international
armed conflict of all biological and chemical methods of warfare. "31 Of
course, this merely represented the political judgment of those. nations which
voted in favor of the resolution.
The need to maintain a supply of chemical weapons for use in retaliation
against a violator of the provisions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, or any other
"first user," has created the longtime problem of finding a safe method for
the disposition of overage gas, with leaky containers adding to the difficulties
of the possessor. One technical advance in this field, the so-called "binary"
gases, will considerably alleviate this problem. These gases consist of two
non-toxic chemicals which only become toxic when mixed, an action which
is accomplished while, for example, an artillery shell is in flight. A
representative of the Chemical Corps of the United States Army listed the
advantages of binary weapons as including "improved safety during
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production, transportation and storage; no requirement for high-cost toxic
production facilities; and simplified low-cost demilitarization procedures. "32
A number of problems have arisen with respect to the interpretation of
the 1925 Geneva Protocol. One such problem is whether it includes within
its prohibitions the use of smoke, sometimes a major weapon in naval warfare,
and the use of riot control agents, such as lachrymatories, or tear gas. The
argument against the use of smoke, that it at least temporarily incapacitates
due to a type of asphyxia, is weak and is not very frequently advanced.
Originally the British interpreted the provisions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol
as covering lachrymatories.33 However, deeming it an essential weapon for
use in Northern Ireland, in 1970 the British Government took the position
that "cs and other such gases" were not prohibited by the 1925 Geneva
Protocol.34 Practically all governments use lachrymatories domestically for
the suppression of such events as riots and other civil disturbances.
Nevertheless, the propriety of their use in armed conflict remains a matter
of dispute.
A further problem of interpretation is whether the Protocol includes within
its prohibitions the use of herbicides. This problem arose during World War
II when the question was raised as to whether it would be in accordance with
international law to use "crop-destroying chemicals" on the gardens being
grown by Japanese units located on by-passed islands of the Pacific. Although
the Judge Advocate General of the Army found no legal impediment to such
action,35 no action was taken, probably because it would have been a waste
of resources. During the hostilities in Vietnam herbicides were used
extensively, both for crop destruction and as a defoliant. 36 When the issue
was raised in the Senate during the consideration by that body of the 1925
Geneva Protocol, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense arrived
at the same conclusion the Army had reached in 1945.37 Nevertheless, as will
be noted below, the United States has renounced the first use of herbicides
except for certain extremely limited purposes.38
Another such problem of interpretation is whether incendiary weapons are
within the prohibitions of the Protocol. The United States has long taken
the position that there is no rule of international law prohibiting the use of
incendiary weapons. 39 At a conference of experts convened in 1969 by the
International Committee of the Red Cross, some of the experts were of the
opinion that the use of incendiary weapons, and particularly napalm, was
prohibited by the 1925 Geneva Protocol because, by burning the oxygen, it
"causes a sort of asphyxia. " Others took the position that incendiary weapons
were not prohibited but were subject to "discriminating" use. The ICRC
concluded that "more extensive studies should be made of the consequences
of incendiary weapons in order to reach a clear legal solution as to their
employment. "40 The U.N. Report with respect to chemical and
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bacteriological (biological) weapons, published that same year, contains the
following relevant statement:
We also recognize that there is a dividing line between chemical agents of warfare,
in the sense in which we use the terms, and incendiary substances, such as napalm and
smoke, which exercise their effects through fire, temporary deprivation of air or reduced
visibility. We regard the latter as weapons which are better classified with high
explosives than with the substances with which we are concerned. They are therefore
not dealt with further in this report.41

Studies were subsequently made by a group of experts appointed by the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, by the Stockholm Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI), and by the ICRC itself in 1973, in 1974, and in 1976; and
probably by other organizations and institutions. The U.N. experts found it
appropriate "to bring to the attention of the General Assembly the necessity
of working out measures for the prohibition of the use, production,
development and stockpiling of napalm and other incendiary weapons"42a clear indication of their understanding that there was no such prohibition
then extant. The author of the SIPRI report stated that "there was never
any positive indication that the intention of the [1925] Geneva Protocol was
to prohibit incendiaries. "43 The ICRC studies were inconclusive. 44 Finally,
the subject was discussed by the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons
of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts45 and the
Diplomatic Conference adopted a resolution in which it recommended the
convening of a conference to draft agreements on certain conventional
weapons. 46 Such a conference was held in 1980 and resulted in, among others,
a Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use ofIncendiary Weapons. 47
. This Protocol does not prohibit the use of incendiaries; it merely places certain
restrictions on the manner in which they may be used. The sum total to be
derived from the foregoing survey is, of course, that incendiary weapons do
not come within the purview of the prohibitions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol
or, for that matter, of any other international agreement on the law of war.
The 1980 Protocol provides that it is prohibited "to make the civilian
population, individual civilians or civilian objects the object of attack by
incendiary weapons." (Of course, the law of war generally prohibits such
attacks by any weapon!) Such a prohibition, and the accompanying restrictions
on the use of air-delivered and other types of incendiary weapons intended
to implement that prohibition, would obviously have no effect on naval
engagements at sea. However, they would be applicable with respect to naval
bombardments of land targets, either by warships or by aircraft, and with
respect to the use of incendiaries by marines ashore.
Now le~ us see where the United States stands generally on the question
of chemical warfare. It has already been mentioned that the United States
did not ratify the 1899 Declaration and that the 1925 Geneva Protocol was
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not ratified by it until 1975. During that 50-year interim period the position
of the United States with respect to chemical warfare was well summed up
in the predecessor to the Handbook, which contained the following statement:
The United States is not a party to any treaty now in force that prohibits or restricts
the use in warfare of poisonous or asphyxiating gases or of bacteriological weapons.
Although the use of such weapons frequently has been condemned by states, including
the United States, it remains doubtful that, in the absence of a specific restriction established by
treaty a state legally is prohibited at present from resorting to their use. However, it is clear that
the use of poisonous gas or bacteriological weapons may be considered justified against
an enemy who first resorts to the use of these weapons. [Footnotes omitted]48

The United States has almost uniformly taken the position that there is no
customary law prohibiting the use of these weapons. 49 During the hostilities
in Vietnam the United States used two controversial types of chemical
weapons - tear gas and herbicides.50 Tear gas was originally used for
humanitarian purposes51 but its utility as a non-lethal gas quickly became
apparent and it was widely used for a number of purposes.52 This created
considerable discussion both in the United States and elsewhere in the world
with the result that on November 25, 1969, President Nixon issued a statement
in which he said that he was resubmitting the 1925 Geneva Protocol to the
Senate for its advice and consent to ratification and that the United States
"Reaffirms its oft-repeated renunciation of the first use of lethal chemical
weapons" and "Extends this renunciation to the first use of incapacitating
chemicals. "53
After extensive hearings and further commitments by the Executive
Branch, the Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratification of the 1925
Geneva Protocol54 and President Ford ratified it on January 22, 1975. The
ratification was deposited, and the Protocol became binding on the United
States, on April 10, 1975. On April 8, 1975, President Ford signed Executive
Order 11,850 which provides:
The United States renounces, as a matter of national policy, first use of herbicides
in war except use, under regulations applicable to their domestic use, for control of
vegetation within U.S. bases and installations or around their immediate defensive
perimeters, and first use of riot control agents in war except in defensive military modes
to save lives such as:
(a) Use of riot control agents in riot control situations in areas under direct and distinct
U.S. military control, to include controlling rioting prisoners of war.
(b) Use of riot control agents in situations in which civilians are used to mask or
screen attacks and civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided.
(c) Use of riot control agents in rescue missions in remotely isolated areas, of downed
aircrews and passengers, and escaping prisoners.

Levie

341

(d) Use of riot control agents in rear echelon areas outside the zone of immediate
combat to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists and paramilitary
organizations.55

Fortunately, since the issuance of that Executive Order, the United States
has not been involved in any armed conflict which would make its application
appropriate. However, the Handbook, issued in 1987, further illuminates the
United States position with respect to the use of chemical weapons. It will
be recalled that its predecessor, The Law ofNaval Warfare, stated that it would
be difficult to hold that use of such weapons was prohibited by customary
internationallaw. 56 In a complete turnabout, the Handbook says:
The United States considers the prohibition against first use of lethal and
incapacitating chemical weapons to be part of customary international law and,
therefore, binding on all nations whether or not they are parties to the 1925 Gas
Protocol. 57

It will be interesting to record the reactions to this position of states which
are still not parties to the 1925 Protocol and which have not committed
themselves in the General Assembly of the United Nations. 58
As we shall see, there is in existence a Convention which supplements the
1925 Geneva Protocol by prohibiting the development, production, and
stockpiling of biological agents and their delivery weapons. 59 Although
separate proposals made in 1962 by both the Soviet Union and the United
States included similar provisions with respect to chemical weapons,60 both
the United Kingdom and the United States later insisted on separating
chemical weapons from the others. As a result, despite fairly continuous
efforts, the only restriction on chemical weapons at the present time is the
1925 Geneva Protocol which prohibits use only.
In 1984 then Vice President Bush went to Geneva to attend a meeting of
the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and to table a United States proposal
which sought to accomplish for chemical weapons what had already been
accomplished for biological weapons. 61 It has since been under consideration
in the CD, which subsequently drafted and studied a 1987 revision.62 In January
1989 a conference hosted by the French Government in Paris adopted a
resolution calling for reaffirmation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and stressed
"the necessity of concluding, at an early date, a convention on the prohibition
of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons
and on their destructipn."63 In July 1989 the United States and the Soviet Union
reached agreement on the key remaining issues64 and currently (December
1989) the CD is working on a May 1989 version65 with changes made up to
15 October 1989.66 In view of the insistence of the United States on
"anywhere-anytime" inspections, it is of interest to know that the Soviet
Union has agreed to permit "surprise inspections" and that it is now the
United States which has a problem in this respect in view of the Fourth
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Amendment to the Constitution, prohibiting "unreasonable searches and
seizures. "67
The wheels of diplomacy grind slowly (witness the years of discussion of
the 1982 U.N. Law of the Sea Convention and of the 1977 Protocols68 ), so
there is still the possibility that in the not-too-distant future there will be
agreement on a Convention which will prohibit the development, production,
and stockpiling of chemical agents and their delivery systems, as well as
providing for the destruction of all such chemical agents now in the arsenals
of parties to such a Convention.69

Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons
Bacteriological (biological)70 weapons have been defined as "living
organisms, whatever their nature, or infective material derived from them,
which are intended to cause disease or death in man, animals or plants, and
which depend for their effects on their ability to multiply in the person, animal
or plant attacked."71 International restrictions on the use of biological
weapons present far fewer legal problems than do those on the use of chemical
weapons. In fact, the legal situation is so clear that the major problem is,
once again, that of ensuring compliance.
It will be recalled that by the declaration contained in the 1925 Geneva
Protocol the Parties agreed "to extend the prohibition [against the use of
poisonous gas] to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare. ''72 The League
of Nations Disarmament Conference discussed the matter and attempted,
albeit unsuccessfully, to draft a treaty which would have prohibited the
production and stockpiling of both chemical and biological weapons. During
World War II considerable scientific research was done on biological
weapons. However, no such weapons were used by either side, with one
possible exception. The Soviet Union has long contended that during World
War II the Japanese had a unit called "Bacteriological Detachment 731"
located at Harbin in China and that this unit had conducted bacteriological
experiments on several thousand Chinese, Koreans, Russians, and, perhaps,
Americans. When the war ended, many of the senior officers of this unit were
taken into Soviet custody and in December 1949 twelve of them were tried
by a Soviet court at Khabarovsk, were found guilty of engaging in
bacteriological warfare, and received sentences of confinement in a labor
correction camp for terms varying from two to twenty-five years.73 In 1982
the Japanese Government acknowledged that such a unit had existed during
the war.74 Assuming that the Soviet charges are correct, it would appear that
the activities of the Japanese unit never passed the experimental stage, that
it never reached the stage of actual use of biologicals against enemy military
forces as a weapon of war.
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In 1962 the Soviet Union tabled at the meeting of the Eighteen Nation
Disarmament Committee (ENDC) a proposal for general and complete
disarmament which included the following provision: "The prohibition, and
destruction of all stockpiles, and the cessation of the production of all kinds
of weapons of mass destruction, including atomic, hydrogen, chemical,
biological and radiological weapons. ''75
A few weeks later the United States submitted its counterproposal with
a provision which called for "Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear,
chemical, bacteriological, and other weapons of mass destruction and
cessation of the production of such weapons. ''76
In view of the close similarity of the two proposals, it would seem that
agreement with respect at least to chemical and biological weapons could
have been quickly attained. 77 However, such was not the case. There were
those who took the position that chemical and biological weapons should not
be joined in the same treaty as there was experience with chemical weapons,
but none with biologicals. While the relevance of this argument is far from
clear, it was sufficient to delay the affirmative action which might otherwise
have been taken. Finally, in 1969 the United Kingdom submitted a proposal
which called for a complete ban on "microbial or other biological agents,"
but made no mention of chemical weapons. 7S When, in 1971, the United States
and the Soviet Union tabled identical drafts79 relating to biologicals only, the
result was a foregone conclusion. Using that draft as a working document
the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD, which had
replaced ENDC) produced a Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.so Its most important provision
states:
Article 1
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop,
produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain:
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method
of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic,
protective or other peaceful purposes;
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins
for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

It also contains provisions requiring each State Party to destroy all of the
items specified in Article 1 within nine months of the Convention coming
into force (presumably, for the State concerned); and an undertaking not to
transfer to any recipient, or to encourage the manufacture of, any of the
prohibited items.
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It is thus evident that States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and to
the 1972 Bacteriological Convention are prohibited from developing,
manufacturing, stockpiling, acquiring, retaining, or using biological weapons. In view
of the coverage of the Convention, nations have not made "first use"
reservations. The two international agreements were intended to, and should,
eliminate biologicals from the arsenals of all such Parties and should mean
that in any future war, large or small, limited or unlimited, conventional or
unconventional, biologicals would not be a factor. Unfortunately, events have
already demonstrated that these expectations will not be met.
A catastrophe occurred in Sverdlovsk in the Soviet Union in 1980 in which
more than 1,000 people died as a result of what appears to have been anthrax
poisoning, although Soviet officials claimed that the deaths had been caused
by meat contaminated by hoof-and-mouth disease. sl In addition, the United
States has contended that the Soviet Union, either directly or through
surrogates, has used biological (as well as chemical) weapons in Southeast
Asia and in Afghanistan. 82 If, as is generally believed, the Sverdlovsk incident
involved anthrax, and if, as the United States contends, biologicals have been
used by the Vietnamese in Kampuchea and Laos and by the Soviet Union
in Afghanistan, then the Soviet Union is manufacturing and using biologicals,
contrary to the provisions of the two agreements to which it is a party.
Unfortunately, the 1925 Geneva Protocol contains no provision for
verification and the only provision for verification contained in the 1972
Convention is a meaningless one providing for resort to the Security Council.
The predecessor to the Handbook, published at a time when the United States
was not a party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and when the 1972 Bacteriological
Convention had not yet been drafted, stated:
The United States is not a party to any treaty now in force that prohibits or restricts
the use in warfare ... of bacteriological weapons. Although the use of such weapons
frequently has been condemned by states, including the United States, it remains doubtful
that, in the absence of a specific restriction established by treaty, a state legally is
prohibited at present from resorting to their use. [Footnotes omitted.]83

This was probably a fair statement of the United States position until
November 25, 1969, when President Nixon, on behalf of the United States,
renounced the use of biological weapons by this country.54 Three months later
he included toxins in this renunciation. S5 Then this country became a party
to the 1972 Bacteriological Convention and in 1975 it finally ratified the 1925
Geneva Protocol with its ban on the use of biologicals. Once again, however,
it appears that the Handbook may be going too far when it asserts:
The United States considers the prohibition against the use of biological weapons
during armed conflict to be part of customary intemationallaw and thereby binding
on all nations whether or not they are parties to the 1925 Gas Protocol or the 1972
Biological Weapons Convention.86
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Can it be that while at a particular point in time a principle may not
necessarily be a binding rule of customary international law, it becomes such
as soon as the United States ratifies a treaty containing that principle?
Certainly, the United States did not consider itself bound by any rule of
customary international law prohibiting the use of biologicals when it issued
its military manuals in 1955 and 1956; nor did it consider itself so bound at
any time thereafter, even when (and until) President Nixon made his 1969
and 1970 statements unilaterally renouncing the use of biologicals and toxins.
Would the 50 or more nations which are not parties to the 1925 Geneva
Protocol and the 50 or more nations which are not parties to the 1972
Bacteriological Convention agree with the quoted statement? Or is this
statement, and the similar one with respect to chemical weapons quoted
above, inserted in order to convince non-parties that they might just as well
ratify the agreements as they are bound by them in any event?
In view of the mobility of naval forces, it has always been considered
unlikely, but not impossible, that naval vessels at sea will have to meet the
problem of defending themselves against an attack using biological (or
chemical) weapons. Should such an attack occur, for example by guided
missiles which succeed in penetrating the vessel's defenses and dispense the
lethal item, the attack would have a devastating effect because air-intake
systems would quickly disseminate it throughout the interior of the vessel,
or because concurrent high-explosive ordnance would have pierced the shell
of the ship. Items such as masks, special clothing, etc., available for the
protection of the individual members of the crew, would greatly impede the
functioning of the crew, even if there was time to don them. In addition,
naval vessels, naval guns and naval aircraft might well be among the weapons
systems used for the delivery of biologicals against land targets, should
biologicals ever be used in wartime. Thus, in a field trial, a ship sailing 16
kilometers offshore travelled a distance of 260 kilometers parallel to the
coastline discharging a harmless powder. The resulting aerosol covered an
area of over 75,000 square kilometers. Had the material disseminated been
a biological "depending on the organism and its degree of hardiness, areas
from 5,000 to 20,000 square kilometers could have been effectively attacked,
infecting a high proportion of unprotected people in the area. "87

Conclusions
There is no law in force, conventional or customary, which prohibits the
use of nuclear weapons. However, there can be no winners, but only losers,
no victors, but only vanquished, in the event of a nuclear war. Whether or
not a war in which nuclear powers are involved becomes a nuclear war will
depend upon the wisdom and leadership of the political leaders of those powers
and upon the extent to which the desire to win the war outweighs a reluctance
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to bring disaster not only upon the enemy, but also upon their own people
and upon the peoples of neutral nations.
Chemical and biological weapons, like nuclear weapons, are weapons of
mass destruction. Once released 'they are beyond the control of the user and,
like nuclear weapons, their effects can come back to haunt the user. The use
of certain chemicals can have widespread, long-lasting, and severe
consequences for the environment and for the populations. This is even more
true with respect to the use of many biologicals. The use of either of these
types of weapons is prohibited by an international agreement to which more
than two-thirds of the nations of the world community are parties. The very
existence of biological weapons is prohibited by an international agreement
with a similar amount of participation. Hopefully, there will, in due course,
be an identical prohibition with respect to chemical weapons.
In view of the tremendous lethal and destructive capabilities of nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons one might almost regret our inability to
tum the clock back to the nineteenth century, when nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons, as we now know them, were not even a gleam in a
scientist's eyes.
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